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ABSTRACT
Fear is one of the negative outcomes of terrorist attacks. Currently, there
is a need to understand how societal fear and fear of terrorismmight be
shaped and induced by social-media discussions. This study analyzed
how exposure to cyberhate was associated with perceived societal fear
after the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks. Demographically
balanced data sets were collected from France, Spain, Finland,
Norway, and the United States four weeks after the attacks. Cyberhate
exposure was associated with higher perceived societal fear in all coun-
tries studied even when adjusting for confounding factors. This was
particularly evident in the case of cyberhate related to terrorism. Hateful
online communication after disruptive events may contribute to a social
climate of fear and escalate societal uncertainty. There are, however,
indications that social trust may bolster against perceived societal fear,
hence enhancing resilience.
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Hate is among the most powerful emotions, involving intense hostility, aversion, and anger
associating to fear and a sense of physical or psychological injury.1 Cyberhate (i.e., online hate,
online hate speech) targets either individuals or groups of people with intensive and hostile
statements and content. Cyberhate is a global phenomenon that typically takes the form of
harassing, threatening, or insulting messages concerning, for example, sexual orientation,
religious conviction, ethnic background, appearance, or gender.2 Cyberhate can take many
forms including cyber racism.3 Hence, the deﬁnition of cyberhate is close to hate speech as
described by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance:
Hate speech . . . entails the use of one or more particular forms of expression—namely, the
advocacy, promotion or incitement of the denigration, hatred or viliﬁcation of a person or
group of persons, as well any harassment, insult, negative stereotyping, stigmatisation or threat
of such person or persons and any justiﬁcation of all these forms of expression—that is based on
a non-exhaustive list of personal characteristics or status that includes “race”, colour, language,
religion or belief, nationality or national or ethnic origin, as well as descent, age, disability, sex,
gender, gender identity and sexual orientation.4
Examples of cyberhate range from verbal insults to very graphic manifestations of violence,
including beheading videos by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) on YouTube. During
the early 2000s, hateful messages were distributed mostly via extremist white supremacist
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websites, such as Stormfront.org.5 With the rise of social media, cyberhate became more of an
everyday phenomenon.6 In 2013–2014, the four-country comparative Hate Communities
Project found that exposure to cyberhate (i.e., having witnessed hate online) was relatively
widespread in the United States (53%), Finland (48%), Germany (31%), and the United
Kingdom (39%), though there were some variations. Rates of cyberhate victimization ranged
from 4 to 16%, and only a few young people produced hate content.7
Exposure is higher in countries such as the U.S. that do not control or regulate hate
speech or hateful messages online.8 Eﬀorts to regulate cyberhate and hate speech have
been made especially in Europe.9 The recent body of literature has shown that preventive
measures should be applied because cyberhate may carry many negative consequences for
those who see it and become victimized by it.10 Cyberhate may also increase intergroup
conﬂicts within society11 and it may act as an incentive for hateful acts oﬀ-line.12 Hence,
cyberhate does not involve only what occurs on the Internet and social media, but has
wider impact on society, public discourse, and public anxieties.13
Cyberhate is a dynamic phenomenon; it takes diﬀerent forms, it transforms quickly,
and it generally follows societal trends and public discussion. Dramatic and disruptive
societal events may also be one cause of cyberhate. Williams and Burnap showed how
racial and religious cyberhate were triggered in the UK after religious cyberhate escalated
in the wake of a murder by Islamic extremists in the UK. Hence, speciﬁc societal events act
as trigger events that make certain forms of expression more common.14 Terrorist attacks
are a type of disruptive event that might be assumed to serve as such triggers for
cyberhate,15 and they are known to evoke personal and sociotropic fear.16 To date,
research has shown that both fear and hate are often expressed after these types of events,
but there is no evidence whether exposure to cyberhate is associated with increased fear.
Furthermore, there is a need to understand whether speciﬁc forms of cyberhate might be
more harmful than others in some situations.
In this ﬁve-country study, we investigated how exposure to cyberhate was associated with
perceived societal fear directly after the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks. On November
13, 2015, ISIS terrorists killed 30 people in Paris. The impacts of the attacks were not limited to
France and Paris: They elicited major societal reactions throughout Europe and across the
world, which makes it interesting to compare reactions across countries. We expect here that
the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks had a triggering eﬀect on cyberhate, and we
hypothesize that exposure to cyberhate might instigate societal fear.
Psychological vulnerability and cultivation of fear after attacks
Disruptive events such as terrorist attacks have many impacts both at the psychosocial and
the societal level. Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, fear, and anxiety are
frequently documented after both terrorist attacks and rampage shootings.17 Rapid upticks
in PTSD and acute stress reaction were recorded in Paris on the days following the attack.18
Typically, it takes time for the aﬀected communities to recover from the impact.19 In New
York, PTSD prevalence dropped after the September 11 attacks from 7.5% after 1 month to
0.6% after 6 months.20 Other nationwide studies have indicated that the prevalence of
arousal and anxiety and PTSD were high 1 and 2 months after the September 11 attacks
but declined in the year following the attacks.21 Similar ﬁndings were found after the
London attacks.22
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An important lesson of the studies following September 11 was that the negative eﬀects of
terrorist attacks are not limited to direct victims and their families. Local people and even
people living far away can be psychologically aﬀected.23 Thus, terrorist attacks have the
potential to make fear a more widespread societal phenomenon. Studies show that terrorist
attacksmay be followed by an increase in both fear of personal victimization andmore general
societal fear related to the fate of the nation, even though the eﬀects vary.24 Moreover, there
are indications that terrorist attacks create greater cautiousness, as expressed, for example, in
lower trust and increased prejudice toward members of out-groups.25
Media exposure has been shown to be an important factor in shaping people’s emotional
responses. For example, studies conducted after September 11 have shown that the number
of hours of footage viewed related to the attacks was associated with PTSD symptoms.26
Besides PTSD and general anxiety, the footage may also have aroused fear of terrorism and
more general societal fear. All three—PTSD, anxiety, and fear—partially overlap and involve
aversive and activated states focused on threat.27 According to Nellis and Savage, exposure
to television news was associated with fear of terrorism after the September 11 attacks. Their
ﬁndings support the media cultivation hypothesis from communication studies.28
Proponents of this hypothesis emphasize that the more people spend time on TV sets, the
more TV becomes part of their reality.29 Terrorism is just one example of media eﬀects and
fear of crime. Criminological studies have documented how crime news can intensify fear
and public anxiety.30
Although such media eﬀects were important during the TV era, the current social-media
era has changed the ways in which information is distributed. Although there is no doubt that
more news and information are now accessible and can spread more rapidly than before,31
researchers disagree as to whether social media has led to more diversiﬁed or segmented news
consumption32 and to the development of ﬁlter bubbles.33 The identity bubble reinforcement
(IBR) model by Keipi et al. addresses how current social media develop bubbles of inﬂuence
around us. The theory considers choices related to routine activities, computer algorithms,
and social identity that people make online. Social media bubbles generally bring together
like-minded individuals, but they may also involve that people are targeted by cyberhate
because of their previous social media likes and preferences. In this sense, social media would
intensify the exposure to online hate and possibly the experience of it. In addition, social
media is always at least partly personal, and hence being exposed to shocking content on social
media is likely to be more intimidating than seeing the same content in regular TV news or in
the newspaper.34
A recent large-scale Facebook experiment by Kramer, Guillory, and Hancock on
689,003 people entailed the manipulation of negative and positive posts. Decreasing the
number of positive messages decreased positivity and increased negativity. Decreasing the
number of negative messages had an analogous eﬀect. This study concluded that emotions
expressed on Facebook can aﬀect people.35 These results are understandable from the
perspective of social contagion theory, which predicts the transference of emotional states
within a social network.36
After terrorist attacks diﬀerent rumors are often distributed, and they may have an
impact on people’s fear.37 Social media is potentially very powerful compared to traditional
media. The social bubbles or “echo chambers” may lead to polarization in public opinions
and aggressive commenting between social groups.38 Such echo chambers are also eﬃcient
in spreading fear.
TERRORISM AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 3
Subsequently, social media diﬀers greatly from traditional media and allows faster
potential exposure. It is characterized by rapid interaction going from peer to peer without
oﬃcial control. Social media also involves anonymity in some degree and interaction
taking place within diﬀers from face-to-face interaction.39 This is considered to make
diﬀerent online groups more eﬃcient in drawing people into following their activities and
norms, compared to those oﬄine.40
In sum, impacts of disruptive events range from PTSD and anxiety and fear41 to social
discussions and potential intergroup conﬂicts.42 Perceived societal fear is one of the negative
outcomes of disruptive events, and it might be more intense when people are constantly
exposed to material on terrorism on their social-media networks. The media cultivation
hypothesis, the IBR model, and social contagion theory all indicate that when people are
exposed to oﬀsetting media or social-media contents, this might lead to increased fear. These
all underline how people are being aﬀected by other people’s opinions and the media content
around them. Cyberhate especially entails very strong emotions, and it may lead to a negative
spiral when expressions of hate foster more hate and more negative emotions.43
Psychological and societal resilience after attacks
Although studies have pointed out that PTSD, anxiety, and fear increase after disruptive
events, most people are resilient to these negative eﬀects.44 Psychological resilience is
deﬁned as the ability to maintain stable and healthy levels of psychological and physiological
functioning after disruptive events.45 Analogically, societal resilience refers to the capacity of
social communities to respond to and recover from the shock of disruptive events such as
terrorism.46 Both psychological and societal resilience are important in understanding the
perceived societal fear after attacks. Resilient individuals and communities are not shaken by
disruptive events and are expected to recover better.
Previous research has shown that some population groups are more resilient than others
to the potentially damaging impact of terrorism. High socioeconomic status, old age, and
male gender are associated with resilience.47 The explanation for these ﬁndings is in line
with both psychological and sociological mechanisms. Higher socioeconomic position
provides assets that facilitate the capacity to tolerate misfortunes during the life course.48
Besides economic resources, availability of informal social support and strong social ties are
assets that buﬀer against stressors.49 The adult population has generally better chances of
coping compared to children.50 Girls and women reportedly experience disruptive events
more intensively than boys and men.51 In addition to this, however, women have been
found to use coping strategies more actively than men, although they also appraise stressors
more than men do.52
Despite the fact that the concept of resilience is seldom used in criminology, it bears an
analogy to fear-of-crime literature, in which females report higher levels of fear.53 Results of
fear-of-crime studies, however, paradoxically show that people who are older have higher
fear of crime although they are the least at risk.54 Also, in some studies conducted after
September 11, older age groups showed more fear of terrorism.55 Perhaps the most coherent
view is provided in a 3-year follow-up study on the September 11 attacks by Scott, Poulin,
and Silver. They found lower levels of anxiety and PTSD but higher levels of fear among
older adults.56 Scott et al. suspected that “older adults may experience event-speciﬁc anxiety
or worry but that this does not necessarily spill over into their general emotional life.”57
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When it comes to societal resilience, trust in institutions and interpersonal trust are two
central elements of functioning societies.58 Institutional trust indicates how people value
the ability of their institutions to protect society from disruptive events and prevent future
attacks. Interpersonal trust is also highly important after disruptive events. Although some
studies have noted an increase in social solidarity and social cooperation after terrorist
attacks and mass murders,59 disruptive events are also likely to cause societal tensions and
intergroup conﬂict as well as to decrease out-group trust.60 Uncertainty-identity theory
predicts that in times of social uncertainty, people tend to identify more strongly toward
in-groups and categorize social reality more rigidly and in a more exclusionary manner to
overcome the experienced uncertainty. This may eventually lead to extremism, more
conﬂicts, and less interpersonal trust.61
Country diﬀerences in both vulnerability and societal resilience exist. First, some countries
have faced repeated terrorist attacks and threats of terror.62 This also means that terrorism in
these countries may have had a more permanent societal impact, and the attacks might have
inﬂuenced societal resilience. Studies have investigated, for example, areas subjected to
long-term terrorism or civil war63 and communities that have faced mass-scale shootings.64
In addition, there are major country diﬀerences in social capital and social trust.65 In line with
Norris et al.,66 social capital is a central element of societal resilience; the hypothesis is that
high-trust societies are more resilient. Based on these studies, it is reasonable to assume that
high-trust societies are more resilient to terrorism and that it is important to investigate the
consequences of terrorism from a comparative perspective.
Although tragedies have speciﬁc outcomes in diﬀerent countries, at least some of the
impacts have been similar across the Western world.67 Cyberhate is likely to play a
signiﬁcant part in creating tension after disruptive events and thus potentially weakens
societal resilience. Discussions after terrorist attacks have involved, for example,
Islamophobia and racism.68 These discussions may also weaken the role of societal resilience
as they directly disrupt the social cohesion within the community or society. Public policies
may have an impact on these issues and provide material and resources for those spreading
and sending hate messages online. After the increasing number of terrorist attacks in
Western countries since the early 2000s, the position of Muslims has changed from an
ethnic minority to a potential security risk group in many countries, such as the UK.69
Counterterrorism has promoted fear of the next attack and contributed to a climate of
fear.70 In this sense it is necessary to address cross-national variations in societal fear and
cyberhate exposure in Western countries.
This study
In this study, our aim was to show whether exposure to cyberhate is associated with the
perception of societal fear after the Paris terrorist attacks of November 2015 in France,
Spain, Finland, Norway, and the U.S. The analysis focused on both general and speciﬁc
forms of cyberhate, and we expected exposure to cyberhate, especially that related to
terrorism, to predict perceived societal fear. This hypothesis is based on previous studies
showing that people exposed to footage or discussions on terrorism show more distress,
anxiety, and fear.71 The hypothesis is also grounded in the perspective provided by the
media cultivation hypothesis,72 the IBR model,73 and social contagion theory.74
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Although our primary focus was on the association between perceived societal fear and
exposure to cyberhate, based on our literature review it was important to control for
general-media and social-media use.75 We also adjusted factors related to both psychologi-
cal and societal resilience, including gender, age, institutional trust, generalized trust, and
out-group trust. Based on previous research, we expected women and older age groups to
show more fear.76 We also expected high levels of general-media and social-media use to be
associated with societal fear, especially if the content concerned the Paris terrorist attacks.
Social trust is seen here as a confounding factor that can level oﬀ heightened fear experi-
ences. In general, those who are more trusting of state institutions and other people are
expected to report lower levels of societal fear.77
Five countries from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) were selected for the study on the basis of potential diﬀerences in reactions to
the recent terrorist events: France, Spain, Finland, Norway, and the U.S. France serves as the
starting point for this study, and it is assumed to have the highest levels of perceived societal
fear due to the November 2015 attacks. Spain is the closest European comparison to France
because of the repeated number of acts of terrorism in past decades.78 Finland and Norway
represent the Nordic welfare states typically characterized by high social trust of other
people and state institutions.79 Norway, however, had a severe terrorist attack in 2011 on a
scale not seen in Finland.80 Nonetheless, Finland has also had several small-scale tragedies,
especially two notorious school shootings.81 Therefore, Finland and Norway are interesting
points of comparison in the Nordic regime. The U.S. was selected as an obvious point of
comparison for the European countries. In recent years, the country has suﬀered several
domestically and internationally inﬂuenced terrorist attacks.
Methods
Participants and procedure
Demographically balanced data sets were collected from France (n = 2113), Spain (n = 1661),
Finland (n = 1003), Norway (n = 1013), and the U.S. (n = 1420) from December 10–15, 2015,
only 4 weeks after the attacks in Paris. Participants were drawn from the panel of respondents
who volunteered to participate in survey research. The panel was administered by TNS
Gallup, and the sample was stratiﬁed to mirror the population of each country in terms of
age, gender, and region. The quotas used allowed for small diﬀerences from oﬃcial population
statistics. Participants were 16–84 years of age (MFRA = 41.61, SDFRA = 15.17; MSPA = 41.51,
SDSPA = 13.75; MFIN = 47.68, SDFIN = 17.07; MNOR = 49.63, SDNOR = 17.05; MU.S. = 48.10,
SDU.S. = 16.72), and approximately half of them were female (53.72% FR, 51.50% SPA; 51.25%
FIN; 48.47% NOR; 54.88% U.S.).
All participants ﬁlled out an online survey designed immediately after the Paris terrorist
attacks as part of a comparative research project on societal resilience and terrorist attacks.
The main survey was designed in English and then translated into French, Spanish,
Finnish, and Norwegian by native speakers of these respective languages. The full survey
includes attitudinal measures on activities after the events in Paris, social trust, attitudes
toward immigrants, and terrorism prevention. The respondents completed the survey
online, and the survey was optimized for computers and mobile devices. The survey was
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tested before the full launch. The median response time was 8 minutes in France, Spain,
and the U.S., 9 minutes in Finland, and 10 minutes in Norway.
Measures
Perceived societal fear was measured with a question: “If you compare the [respondent’s
country] today with the situation before the Paris terrorist attacks, would you say that
society is more or less characterized by fear?” The scale varied from 1 (a lot less) to 7
(much more). See Table 1 for mean scores and standard deviations for each country.
Perceived societal fear is used as a dependent variable in the regression models.
Exposure to cyberhate was initially measured with a question: “In the past three months,
have you seen hateful or degrading writings or speech online that inappropriately attack
certain groups of people or individuals?” (yes/no). This question has been widely used in
comparative research on cyberhate82 and national studies on cyberhate.83 Those who
witnessed cyberhate during the past 3 months were asked a follow-up question: “Which
of the following did the hateful or degrading material that you came across online relate
to?” Participants were allowed to select as many answers as applied from the following list:
sexual orientation, sex or gender, physical appearance, disability, ethnicity or nationality,
religious conviction or belief, general hatred of people, and terrorism.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
France Spain Finland Norway U.S.
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Societal fear
(1 = low, 7 = high) 5.48 1.14 5.21 1.12 5.05 .97 4.77 1.06 5.23 1.21
n % n % n % n % n %
Cyberhate exposure 777 35.67 852 42.71 552 57.26 661 67.52 712 52.62
Type of cyberhate exposure
Sexual orientation 205 9.41 266 13.33 149 15.46 94 9.41 288 21.29
Gender 133 6.11 197 9.87 97 10.06 75 7.51 240 17.74
Physical appearance 161 7.39 179 8.97 97 10.06 95 9.51 188 13.90
Disability 76 3.49 83 4.16 37 3.84 42 4.2 118 8.72
Ethnicity 402 18.46 403 20.20 431 44.71 491 49.15 465 34.37
Political views 274 12.58 417 20.90 234 24.27 287 28.73 410 30.30
Religious conviction 441 20.25 498 24.96 367 38.07 452 45.25 484 35.77
General hatred of people 279 12.81 77 3.86 192 19.92 141 14.11 224 16.56
Terrorism 392 18.00 461 23.11 320 33.20 343 34.33 445 32.89
Control variables n % n % n % n % n %
Gender (female) 1135 53.72 1066 51.50 514 51.25 491 48.47 779 54.86
Age
16–25 354 16.75 230 13.85 143 14.26 101 9.97 144 10.14
26–40 691 32.70 622 37.45 224 22.33 254 25.07 355 25.00
41–65 909 43.02 735 44.25 430 42.87 438 43.24 685 48.24
>65 159 7.52 74 4.46 206 20.54 220 21.72 236 16.62
Extensive social-media use related to
the Paris attacks (yes)
701 30.11 788 38.05 75 7.48 66 6.39 354 24.93
Social-media use time (sqrt) 3.00 3.70 3.88 3.61 2.37 2.89 3.55 3.40 3.04 3.90
Media use time (sqrt) 5.36 3.45 6.09 3.39 6.50 3.01 7.63 3.15 5.65 4.24
Institutional trust 3.92 1.12 3.70 1.21 4.50 1.08 4.77 1.06 4.01 1.18
Out-group trust 3.87 1.39 3.89 1.27 4.15 1.34 4.39 1.24 4.16 1.30
Generalized trust 2.99 1.62 3.74 1.64 4.95 1.71 5.25 1.52 3.57 1.75
(1 = low, 7 = high)
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Other variables in this study were treated as controls; they included: a) sociodemo-
graphic variables, b) social media and media use, and c) social trust. Gender and age were
used as standard controls in the models. Age was categorized into four groups (16–25,
26–40, 41–65, and >65). The distribution of these variables is shown in Table 1.
Extensive social-media use related to the Paris terrorist attacks was measured with a set of
ﬁve questions concerning: a) getting updates or passing along information, b) expressing
support and sympathy, c) talking about events and processing grief, d) getting information
about marches or ceremonies, and e) discussing reasons for and consequences of the events.
Answer options were: a) not at all, b) not very much, c) to some extent, and d) to a large
extent. The ﬁve questions had good inter item reliability (α FRA = .91; α SPA = .92; α FIN = .90;
α NOR = .86; α U.S. = .94). A dummy variable was created to indicate those who used social
media related to the Paris terrorist attacks to a large extent (0 = no, 1 = yes).
Daily time spent on news via social media was addressed with the following question:
“On an average day, approximately how many minutes do you spend on news via social
media (such as Twitter, Facebook, etc.)?” A similar question was used for the time spent on
news via media: “On an average day, approximately how many minutes do you spend on
news via media such as TV, radio, and online/oﬀ-line newspapers?” For both, respondents
indicated the amount of time in numbers. Due to the skewed distribution of responses
square root transformation was used for both variables.
Social trust measures include institutional trust, out-group trust, and generalized trust.
All questions on trust were measured with a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely), and
the measures have been widely used in social sciences.84 Institutional trust was measured
with six questions concerning trust of government, congress, or parliament, politicians,
police, military, and courts. Interitem reliability was good (α FRA = .84; α SPA = .87; α
FIN = .87; α NOR = .88; α U.S. = .85). For out-group trust, three questions were used to measure
trust of people from other religions, other nationalities, and immigrants. The three ques-
tions had good interitem reliability (α FRA = .91; α SPA = .89; α FIN = .92; α NOR = .93; α U.
S. = .88). Generalized trust was measured with the following widely used test question:
“Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be
very careful in dealing with people?”
Statistical analyses
Descriptive techniques were applied to provide an overview of the data and key variables.
The main analyses were run by ordinary least squares regression to predict perceived
societal fear. We ﬁrst tested how both general and particular cyberhate were associated
with societal fear. These models were run separately for each type of cyberhate and for
each county. The models were adjusted for age and gender. The second part of analysis
focused on the relationship between societal fear and cyberhate related to terrorism. As we
were mainly interested in the relationship between perceived societal fear and exposure to
cyberhate, we only reported the ﬁnal models including all covariates. Multicollinearity was
not detected, but, because of the heteroscedasticity of residuals, we ran the models using
Huber-White standard errors (i.e., robust standard errors). The models were run and
reported separately for each country. The coeﬃcients of the regression equations are
presented in both nonstandardized (B) and standardized (β) form, and standard errors
(SE) and statistical signiﬁcances (p) are also reported.
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Results
Perceived societal fear was higher in France (5.48) than Spain (5.21), Finland (5.05),
Norway (4.77), and the U.S. (5.23); see Table 1. General exposure to cyberhate was,
however, lowest in France (36%) and highest in Norway (68%). Also, more than half of
the respondents in Finland (57%) and the U.S. (53%) reported seeing cyberhate in the
preceding 3 months. The most common forms of cyberhate targeted ethnicity or nation-
ality, religious belief or conviction, and terrorism. The least frequently seen form of
cyberhate in this study was related to disability.
Table 2 reports the ﬁndings of the regression analyses concerning both general and
speciﬁc types of cyberhate. These analyses were run separately for each type of cyberhate and
for each country, and all models were adjusted for gender and age. Table 2 reports only the
unstandardized regression coeﬃcients (B) of the diﬀerent forms of cyberhate. The general
exposure to cyberhate is signiﬁcantly associated with perceived societal fear in all countries
studied. In other words, those who saw cyberhate were more likely to report higher
perceived societal fear. In France, for example, those exposed to cyberhate reported .28
higher perceived societal fear (on a scale 1 to 7) than those who were not exposed to
cyberhate.
Analysis of speciﬁc types of cyberhate showed that all forms of cyberhate were
signiﬁcantly associated with societal fear in France and the U.S. In Finland, only
cyberhate related to ethnicity or nationality, religious conviction, and terrorism were
associated with societal fear. Similarly, as revealed in Table 2, in Spain and Norway,
only some forms of cyberhate were associated with societal fear. Only cyberhate
related to terrorism was signiﬁcantly associated with societal fear in all countries
studied.
Based on the analyses shown in Table 2, the ﬁnal part of the analysis focused solely on
cyberhate related to terrorism. Table 3 reports the ﬁnal ordinary least squares regressionmodels
predicting perceived societal fear in all countries studied. The ﬁnal models were statistically
signiﬁcant in France, F(11, 1684) = 12.81, p < .001, R2 = .08, Spain, F(11, 1446) = 11.05, p < .001,
R2 = .08, Finland, F(11, 866) = 8.22, p < .001, R2 = .10, Norway, F(11, 908) = 10.60, p < .001,
R2 = .12), and the U.S., F(11, 1202) = 5.52, p < .001, R2 = .05).
Table 2. Perceived societal fear from exposure to general and speciﬁc cyberhate (Regression
Coeﬃcients, Standard Errors, and p-Values).
France Spain Finland Norway U.S.
B SE p B SE p B SE p B SE p B SE p
General cyberhate .28 .05 <.001 .19 .06 .001 .15 .07 .021 .16 .06 .011 .39 .07 <.001
Speciﬁc cyberhate
Sexual orientation .17 .08 .039 .04 .08 .593 .05 .09 .544 .02 .10 .821 .38 .08 <.001
Gender .26 .10 .012 .03 .09 .765 .03 .10 .785 .02 .11 .872 .33 .09 <.001
Physical appearance .40 .09 <.001 .03 .10 .774 −.01 .11 .898 .12 .10 .205 .27 .10 .008
Disability .27 .13 .044 −.02 .13 .852 −.19 .16 .257 .29 .14 .035 .32 .12 .008
Ethnicity .30 .06 <.001 .11 .07 .111 .14 .07 .033 .17 .06 .003 .19 .07 .008
Political views .22 .07 .003 .16 .07 .020 −.01 .07 .894 .22 .06 .001 .34 .07 <.001
Religious conviction .30 .06 <.001 .22 .06 .001 .18 .07 .006 .07 .06 .196 .35 .07 <.001
General hatred of people .33 .07 <.001 −.04 .14 .793 .14 .08 .066 .15 .08 .059 .31 .09 .001
Terrorism .27 .06 <.001 .26 .07 <.001 .21 .07 .002 .23 .06 <.001 .37 .07 <.001
Note. Statistically signiﬁcant (p < .05) results are in boldface. All models are adjusted for age and gender.
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Cyberhate related to terrorism was associated with perceived societal fear in all countries
studied even after adjusting for number of confounding variables. In France, those exposed
to cyberhate report .21 higher societal fear (p = .002). This was .19 in Spain, (p = .004), .16 in
Finland (p = .018), .26 in Norway (p < .001), and .31 in the U.S. (p < .001). Females reported
more perceived societal fear in all countries studied. In France, Finland, and the U.S., older
age groups reported higher perceived societal fear than the youngest age group (16–25 years
of age). Extensive social-media use related to the Paris terrorist attacks was statistically
signiﬁcant for all countries studied, except Finland. Media use time was associated with
societal fear in France and Spain. Institutional trust was not associated with perceived
societal fear, but those reporting higher out-group trust and generalized trust reported
generally lower societal fear.
Discussion
This study focused on determining whether exposure to cyberhate was associated with
increased societal fear after the Paris terrorist attacks in ﬁve countries: France, Spain,
Finland, Norway, and the U.S. Our results showed that people in these countries who were
exposed to cyberhate reported more societal fear than those who were not. This main
ﬁnding was consistent in all ﬁve countries and concerned both general exposure to
cyberhate and cyberhate related to terrorism. Hence, we can conﬁrm the main hypothesis,
which was grounded in the media cultivation hypothesis,85 the IBR model,86 and social
contagion theory.87 All these theories address the idea that media plays animportant role.
Currently, social media are an especially powerful tool for the dissemination of informa-
tion; there is already evidence that emotions expressed on social media can aﬀect people.88
Although the main line of our results was the same in all ﬁve countries, we found that the
eﬀect of general cyberhate was stronger in France and the U.S. This is partly understandable
considering that France was the country most exposed to the Paris terrorist attacks in 2015.
In the same year, the U.S. also faced several smaller attacks and threats. The San Bernardino
terrorist attack, which caused the death of 14 people, took place on December 2, 2015, only
8 days prior to our data collection. Due to the closeness and impact of these attacks,
cyberhate might have also had a stronger role in amplifying the fear. In France and the U.
S., all subtypes of cyberhate were positively associated with perceived societal fear. This was
not found in Spain or the Nordic countries (Finland and Norway). Of the cyberhate
subtypes, only cyberhate related to terrorism was signiﬁcantly associated with perceived
societal fear in all countries studied.
Our full models adjusted for a number of controls including gender, age, media and
social-media use, and trust. As we hypothesized, we found that women perceived more
societal fear than men in all ﬁve countries, except the U.S. Older age was associated with
higher perceived societal fear in all countries studied, except Norway. These results generally
matchwhat has been reported in both fear-of-crime studies89 and studies on fear after terrorist
attacks.90 Those respondents who extensively used social media to communicate regarding the
Paris terrorist attacks reported higher perceived societal fear in all countries studied, expect
Finland. This result also ﬁts into our theoretical framework. Although expressions of sym-
pathy and solidarity may sometimes soothe fear after attacks,91 previous studies have also
indicated that extensive media use is associated with increased fear, anxiety, and PTSD.92
Time spent following news media was also signiﬁcant in France and Spain.
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Trust in other people and in institutions was expected to mitigate perceived societal
fear. In our theoretical model, trust was part of societal resilience and generally part of
functioning societies and communities.93 Distrust and conﬂicts between social groups and
people within society are generally considered to fuel extremism within society.94 In our
model, trust was also an important control because terrorist attacks are likely to cause
tensions. Even after adjusting the level of trust among participants, we found that the
eﬀect of cyberhate remained in all countries studied. In Nordic countries, people reported
higher institutional trust, out-group trust, and generalized trust than in the U.S., France,
and Spain. Institutional trust was not associated with perceived societal fear in any of the
ﬁve countries. Trust of out-groups and people in general was associated with lower
societal fear; however, out-group trust was not signiﬁcant in the US and generalized
trust was not signiﬁcant in Norway.
Our observations indicate that cyberhate is a societal threat as it was associated with an
increased level of perceived societal fear. Social media may increase antagonism between
diﬀerent societal groups, which then might be eﬀective in spreading fear, especially after
disruptive events. Diﬀerent ideological “echo chambers”95 or “identity bubbles”96 may serve
to deepen cleavages and antagonism between diﬀerent groups. However, this fear could be
overcome with societal resilience. Our results show that social trust, either in the form of
generalized social trust or outgroup trust, is associated with lower levels of fear across
countries. This protective eﬀect of social trust has also been found in other studies.97
Maintaining trust in other people and especially those in out-groups, is important for any
functioning communities and societies. Social trust is the glue that holds the society together
and it has an important role in intergroup conﬂict resolution.98
Overcoming cyberhate exposure would be important for building societal resilience.
There are policy measures against cyberhate and legal ways to intervene cyberhate
oﬀending.99 Most recently in Germany, a new law taking eﬀect in 2018, sanctions severely
social media companies such as Facebook, Google, and Twitter if they do not delete
oﬀending messages within 24 hours after being reported. Besides such legal sanctions,
self-regulation and raising awareness has been seen as important in the ﬁght against
cyberhate.100 In addition, building community resilience with civil society interventions
has been seen as a way to contest cyberhate.101 From a critical perspective, such resilience
building would not involve strategies or policies that might increase the fear of disruptive
events as counterterrorism campaigns and policies have sometimes done.102
Limitations
Despite the considerable strength of having data from ﬁve diﬀerent countries, our study has
limitations. The cross-sectional design does not allow us to determine the causal direction of
the associations detected. Obviously, longitudinal research data that allow for analysis of
perceived fear both before and after incidents such as the November 2015 Paris terrorist
attacks would be useful; however, such data are quite diﬃcult to collect. Despite these
limitations, our ﬁndings are in line with previous theory and empirical evidence, and our
models controlled for a number of pertinent factors, including media and social-media use
and trust of other people, out-groups, and institutions. We are therefore conﬁdent in the
robustness of our ﬁndings.
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Conclusion
Cyberhate is considered toxic, and it likely fuels negative online interactions and messages.103
It also spreads rapidly after terrorist attacks;104 hence, it may increase societal uncertainty and
stoke intergroup conﬂicts both online and oﬀ-line. Our comparative study demonstrated that
exposure to cyberhate was signiﬁcantly associated with perceived societal fear after the
November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks. The ﬁndings highlight the negative role of cyberhate
in current social media and indicate that hateful online communication in the aftermath of
tragic societal events may contribute to a social climate of fear and exacerbate societal
uncertainty. There are, however, indications that social trust may bolster against perceived
societal fear, hence enhancing resilience.
As escalation of fear and uncertainty is one of the aims of terrorists themselves,
democratic societies should ﬁnd ways to resist cyberhate. Our ﬁndings further underlined
the importance of societal resilience and particularly the social trust in other people.
Institutional trust does not play a similar role. From our perspective, resilient societies
would be able to ﬁght both fear and hate after terrorists’ attacks. Building societal
resilience is seen also as a preventive measure against inter-group conﬂicts within society.
Resilient societies are better able to bounce forward after terrorist attacks and they are
more capable of early prevention. Future studies should continue to investigate the role of
cyberhate after terrorist attacks to understand how people can be protected from the
harms it engenders.
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